Abstract. Verification of a test case for testing the conformance of protocol implementations against the formal description of the protocol involves verifying three aspects of the test case: expected input/output test behavior, test verdicts, and the test purpose. We model the safety and liveness properties of a test case using branching time temporal logic. There are four types of safety properties: transmission safety, reception safety, synchronization safety, and verdict safety. We model a test purpose as a liveness property and give a set of notations to formally specify a test purpose. All these properties expressed as temporal formulas are verified using model checking on an extended state machine graph representing the composed behavior of a test case and protocol specification. This methodology is shown to be effective in finding errors in manually developed conformance test suites.
Introduction
Communication protocols are the rules that govern communication among components in a distributed system. The four steps in a protocol development process, called protocol engineering lifecycle, are design of a protocol specification, validation and verification of the specification, generation of an implementation from the specification, and conformance checking of the implementation [1] . Conformance of a protocol implementation with its specification means that the implementation under test (IUT) behaves according to the rules described in its specification. In the open systems interconnection (OSI) framework [2] , checking the conformance of an implementation to the corresponding protocol specification is done by testing the implementation using a set of test cases. The testing activity is important, because it ensures that one independently generated implementation of the same protocol can interwork with another.
In the protocol development process, the use of formal description techniques (FDTs) enables protocol designers to verify and validate specifications, and design and verify test cases. Standards organizations, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Consultative Committee for Telephone and Telegraph (CCITT) have defined various FDTs such as LOTOS [3, 4] , Estetle [5, 6] , and SDL [7] to specify protocols; ASNA [8] for defining a data transfer syntax; the Tree and Tabular Combined Notation (TTCN) [2] to specify test suites; and test architectures [2] for executing the test cases.
There are two main approaches to designing a test suite: semiautomatic and human design. In the semiautomatic approach, the formal specification of a protocol is used as a basis for generating test cases. There are a number of test design techniques [9, 10] which algorithmically generate test cases from deterministic finite state machine (FSM) models of protocols. However, generating readily usable complete test cases from other FDTs, such as LOTOS, Estelle, and SDL, is more difficult, and research until now has produced only a partial solution [11, 12] . The limited research that has been reported so far deals only with the local single-layer (LS) test architecture. Semiautomatically generating test cases for more useful test architectures such as the distributed single layer (DS), the coordinated single layer (CS), and the remote single layer (RS), requires more research to be done. Moreover, in the semiautomatic approach, no technique has yet been reported to generate classes of special test cases required to check the multiple-connection support and robustness capabilities of implementations.
Therefore, traditionally, a test suite is designed by a team of designers having expertise in protocol standards and test architectures [13] . Such a human-designed test suite has three advantages over a semiautomatically designed one. First, a test case can be designed with a specific test purpose. Second, test cases can be grouped into various categories, such as basic interconnection tests, capability tests, valid behavior tests, robustness/invalid behavior tests, multiple-connection support tests, etc. Finally, test cases can be manually designed for all four basic test architectures LS, DS, CS, and RS. However, the main disadvantage of human-designed test cases is that those test cases can be error-prone.
In the absence of any complete technique to generate test cases from formal description languages used in specifying protocols, a good alternative is to design test cases manually and use a methodology to verify the correctness of those test cases against the reference formal protocol specification. In this paper, we focus on developing a methodology to verify human-designed test cases.
To verify the correctness of a system, one must verify that the system satisfies its safety and liveness properties. Safety properties st.ate that something bad never happens and liveness properties state that something good eventually does happen. In order to understand the motivations for characterizing the correctness of test cases in terms of safety and liveness, it is important to understand the difference between traditional program testing and protocol testing [1] . Because protocol systems are not the same as traditional software systems, they have special design and implementation concerns. Traditional systems consist of functions that go from an initial state to a final state. Systems accept all input at the beginning of their operations and yield their output at termination. These systems are called transformational because they transform an initial state to a final state. Typical examples are batch, off-line data processing, and numeric computational packages. In transformational systems, a test case consists of a pair of (input, output) [14] , where the input is given to the system at the beginning of its execution and the output is the desired output of the system on its termination.
But some systems, like operating systems and process-control systems, may never terminate. These are called reactive systems. The purpose of running reactive systems is not to get a final output, but rather to maintain some interaction with the system's environment. A reactive system is not restricted to accepting input on initiation and generating output on termination. Some of its input depends on intermediate output. Thus, one cannot adequately specify reactive systems by referring only to their initial and final states. Instead one must refer to their continued behavior, which may be a very long sequence of states and input/output events.
Communication-protocol systems are reactive systems with several unique characteristics: Each protocol input may not have a corresponding output, and one input may have many outputs. The correctness of a protocol's output depends on the values of its preceding output.
Therefore, the structure of a test case for testing communication protocols cannot be described by a simple (input, output) pair. Rather, test cases for such systems must have the following characteristics: sequences of input/output events, ability to check values of parameters in a received event, timer management facility, ability to retransmit the same event for a finite number of times if there is no response from the IUT in an expected time duration, and ability to assign a test verdict at the end of a test session.
Associated with every test case is a test purpose, which is a high-level description of the protocol function to be tested by the test case. If the behavior of the IUT is allowed by the protocol and the test purpose is satisfied, then the test case assigns a Pass verdict. If the behavior of the IUT is not allowed by the protocol, then the test case assigns a Fail verdict. However, if the behavior of the IUT is allowed by the protocol, but the test purpose is not satisfied, then the test case assigns an Inconclusive verdict. Therefore, the correctness of conformance judgment of a test case depends on the correctness of sequences of events input to the IUT, the expected protocol events stated in the test case, the verdicts assigned by the test case, and the purpose of the test case.
Some well-known examples of safety properties of concurrent systems are partial correctness, absence of deadlock, and mutual exclusion. A liveness property that has received a lot of formal treatment is program termination. However, program termination is not a good thing to happen to every computing system~ For example, an operating system should never terminate (crash). For such systems, other kinds of liveness properties are important, for example: Each request for service will eventually be answered, a process will eventually enter its critical section, etc. The nature of safety and liveness properties of a system depends on the nature of the computing system. Therefore, to verify the correctness of test cases, one must define safety and liveness properties applicable to test systems. One contribution of this paper is to define safety and liveness properties relevant to test systems.
An outline of the test verification methodology presented in this paper is as follows. Because protocols and test cases are generally specified using different FDTs, it is essential to represent them in a common notation for the purpose of being able to obtain their combined behavior. Thus, we define a kind of extended finite state machine (EFSM) to which a variety of protocol and test specification languages can be translated. Since a test architecture plays an important role (in the form of defining the logical and distributed interconnection among the entities in a test system) in the design of a test case, we define the notion of a test verification system based on a test architecture and generate the global behavior of the test verification system. That is, we consider test architectural issues [15] in the verification process. To verify the correctness of test cases, we express the test case properties in terms of formulas in branching time temporal logic using the well-known notions of safety and liveness. We define four types of safety properties and one type of liveness property. These properties are then verified, using a model-checking approach, on the global behavior of the test verification system. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the EFSM models of a test case and a protocol specification, a uniform way of representing exchanged data, and a brief introduction to branching time temporal logic. In section 3 the test case verification system is defined, an overview of modelchecking-based test case verification methodology is given, followed by step 1 of the methodology, the global state space generation.
Step 2, the generation of the model is discussed in section 4.
Step 3, formulation of the test case properties is discussed in section 5 where a notation for test purpose representation is developed. The last step of the methodology, the verification of test case properties on the model is presented in section 6. A detailed example of test case verification is given in section 7. In section 8, we summarize all the reported research on test case verification. Some concluding remarks are stated in section 9.
EFSM models and temporal logic
In general, test cases and protocols are specified in different formal description techniques which use different notations to define data types and different behavioral semantics of their operations. For example, according to ISO's standardization framework, test cases are specified in TFCN, whereas a protocol can be specified in LOTOS, Estelle, or SDL.
Estelle is based on a finite state machine model, which is extended by Pascal data types, expressions, and statements. The Estellc specification of a protocol may consist of a large number of interconnected modules which communicate among themselves through (FIFO) channels. LOTOS, a process algebraic specification language, is a combination of Milner's calculus of communicating systems (CCS) formalism for behavior description and abstract data types (ADTs) for data description. A set of composition rules is used to derive larger specifications from the primitive notions of events and processes. SDL, like Estelle, is also based on an extended finite state machine model. It is largely oriented toward a graphical representation. Abstract data types are used to define data in an SDL specification. In the TTCN test specification language, constrained events and subtrees constitute the building blocks in the design of the behavior part of a test case. Data in a test case are described using both a tabular notation and the abstract syntax notation 1 (ASN.1) [8] .
It is not possible to compare the behavior of a test case and the behavior of a protocol specified in different FDTs and using different data definition techniques. Moreover, with such differences, it is not possible to get a combined behavior representing all interaction sequences between a test case and a protocol specification. Therefore, we introduce the notion of a common intermediate model, which is a kind of extended finite-state machine (EFSM), to which protocols and test cases specified in different FDTs can be translated.
In this section, we define an EFSM for modeling protocol and test specifications, define a common notation for events exchanged among the entities in a test architecture, and present a brief overview of branching time temporal logic.
EFSM models
In this section, we describe the EFSM models of test cases and protocol specifications. A communicating EFSM is an 8-tuple, F = < S, V, R, s~t, Z, h0, Ic, Oc >, where S is a tagged set of states such that a tag is an element of the verdict set {Pass, Fail, Inconclusive, Null}; V is a finite set of variables; R is a finite set of possible transitions between states; slnit is the initial state; Z _c S is the set of final states; h0 is the initial assignments to the variables in V in the form of vi ~ vali for some vl ~ V; I~ is a set of input channels from which F receives messages; and O~ is a set of output channels to which F sends messages to communicate with other EFSMs.
A transition in an EFSM is a 6-tuple, r = < 8, 8', a, e, h, n >, where 8 is the from state; s ~ is the to state; a is an action or event clause causing the transition to fire; e is the enabling predicate; h is a set of assignments of values to the variables in V, and n is the priority number of the transition. The priority number is used to model the priority of execution in the case of several alternative transitions from the same state.
An event in a transition can be one of {input, output, internal}, where the input and output events are known as external events and occur at some welldefined interaction points through which EFSMs communicate. An external event is characterized by three parameters: interaction point, direction ("?" denotes an input and "!" denotes an output), and the value (message) passed in the event.
No channel or direction is associated with an internal event.
We use function notations to access the parameters of a transition. For example, dir(E) returns the direction field in the event E; pco(E) returns the interaction point of the event E; and from (r) The dynamic behavior table for a test case contains the specification of the combinations of sequences of test events that are deemed possible by the test suite specifier. The events are combined in two ways: sequences and sets of alternatives. A sequence of events is represented one line after the other, each new event being indented once from left to right, as time is assumed to progress. Test events at the same level of indention and belonging to the same predecessor event represent the possible alternative events which occur at that time. Alternative test events are specified in the order in which the tester shall repeatedly attempt them until one occurs. All the undesired external input events can be trapped by specifying an OTHERWISE event as an alternative to the desired events. Therefore, in a sequence of alternative events, an OTHERWISE event is the last event or an event just before a TIMEOUT. Design of a test case can be modularized by using subtrees and default trees.
It is possible to algorithmically map a TTCN test case to an EFSM [17] . The translation process consists of three steps. In the first step constraints are processed and default behaviors are expanded. A send event constraint is translated to a set of assignments and a receive event constraint is translated to a conjunction of predicates. In the second step, an EFSM is derived from the main tree and for each of the subtrees. In the third step, subtree attachments are resolved by combining the corresponding EFSMs. Each event line in a test case is modeled as a transition. For example, consider the TTCN event line:
where ! represents a send event P_CONreq at the PCO L; x = 2 is a predicate; a := 1 is an assignment; and P_CON.base is a constraint reference. Constraint table that defines P_CON.base is processed first to obtain a sequence of assignments fl to be placed in the assignment clause of the EFSM transition. Then the predicate is placed in the enabling clause, the assignment a := 1 is added to fl, and finally the event clause is set to Lt.P_CONreq. Assuming that the transition occurs from state S1 to state 82 then the verdict tags of both the states are set to Null. If this is the first event in a set of alternatives, then the priority is 1.
The corresponding transition in EFSM notation then becomes:
The initial assignment h0 of T-EFSM is obtained from the initial values provided in the declarations section of the TTCN test case specification. Initial values of ASPs/PDUs are obtained from the base constraints declared in the constraints section. The set of final states Z is derived from the To states of the last event in a sequence. I~/Oc are the PCOs. Since PCOs are bidirectional Ic = Oc. Consecutive events in a set of alternatives are assigned consecutive priority numbers starting with 1. The higher the priority number is, the lower the execution priority.
Representation of data structures.
In the layered OSI communication architecture [18] , two protocol entities communicate through the exchange of events, called abstract service primitives (ASP) and protocol data units (PDU), at the service boundary between them. If data in two communicating entities are defined using different data definition techniques, it is not possible to interpret a received event in a communicating entity. It is rather natural to use different data definition techniques while specifying communication protocols in different FDTs, a test case in TTCN, and a test management protocol in a semiformal manner. The specification languages LOTOS, Estelle, "SDL, and TTCN use abstract data types, Pascal data types, abstract data types, and a tabular notation in addition to ASN.1 to define data and events, respectively. Therefore, it is important that the syntax of and the naming conventions used in the events are interpreted in a unified manner. For this purpose, we use a notation called input/output diagram (IOD) to model events exchanged between two communicating entities. The concept of an I/O diagram was first introduced by Jackson in the context of structured programming [19] .
The IOD notation is selected as a means of representing a communication event because of its ability to represent a variety of attributes of the parameters in the event, such as tree structure of ASP/PDU parameters representing composite data types, grouping of parameters using sequence and set semantics, choice of a parameter among a set of alternatives, repetitive nature of the same parameter, optional~mandatory presence of some parameters in an event, and default values of some parameters.
To represent a communication event as an IOD, we define two primitive building blocks and a notation to combine them to describe a complete ASP/PDU.
An IOD takes a tree structure using two types of nodes: internal and leaf. An internal node, shown in figure 1, contains three fields: name, type, and tag.
The name and type fields represent the name and type of a parameter field. The tag represents a data value's attribute, whose possible values are {optional, mandatory, default, choice, set, sequence}. A leaf node has only one field to contain the value of a type stated in its parent node. Only the leaf nodes in a tree structure contain actual values, whereas the internal nodes are used to build composite data types. For example, an internal node in an ASP may contain a composite type representing a PDU.
An IOD is a tree structure representing an ASP or a PDU. Since only ASPs and PDUs are exchanged among the entities in a test system and since these structures can be specified using different techniques, IOD becomes a common representation. Mapping of IOD from or to individual data representations need only be done at the time ASP/PDUs are placed into channels.
An event parameter can be either a primitive type or a composite type.
Examples of a primitive type are integer type, boolean type, bit string type, etc. A composite type may contain more than one primitive type or a combination of primitive and composite types.
Abstract data types in LOTOS and SDL, record types in Pascal, and tabular notations and ASN.1 in TTCN are used to define events. It is possible to represent all those data types as I/O diagrams [20] .
Branching time temporal logic
Temporal logic has been of particular interest to the designers of both hardware and software specifications for more than a decade in the form of verifying some well-defined properties of specifications [21, 22] . With the widespread use of communication protocols and the subsequent global effort in standardizing formal specifications of protocols, temporal logic has also been used in verifying protocol specifications [23, 24] .
Temporal logics are extensions of the propositional logic. A temporal formula is constructed using propositional variables, the conventional logical operators, and a set of temporal operators. The set of temporal operators in a temporal logic is defined based on the structure of time on which the temporal formalism is based. There are two main classes of temporal logic: linear time and branching time [25] . The linear time temporal logic considers time to be a linear sequence and the branching time approach adopts a tree structured time allowing some instants to have more than a single successor instant. Both types of temporal logic are used in the verification of communication protocols [23, 24, 26] .
Whether to use the linear time logic or the branching time logic is pragmatically based on the types of systems and properties one wishes to formalize and study [25] . Since the global behavior of a test system containing multiple nondeterministic protocol and test entities takes a tree structure rather than a sequential structure, we use branching time temporal logic for studying the properties of a test system. In the following, we present the syntax and semantics of branching time logic.
The advantages of using temporal logic to express test case properties are that it allows us to verify test case properties in terms of the well-known notions of safety and liveness and to express the validity of Pass test verdicts with the satisfaction of test purposes.
Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. BTL formulas are obtained by using the following two rules.
Every atomic proposition p E AP is a BTL formula.
2. If f and g are BTL formulas, then so are -~f, f^ 9, f v9,
The symbols -1, ^, and V have their usual meanings. U is the until operator; the formula A[f U 9] (Elf U g]) intuitively means that for every computation path (for some computation path) there exists an initial prefix of the path such that 9 holds at the last state of the prefix and f holds at all other states along the prefix.
The semantics of a BTL formula are defined with respect to a labeled state transition graph.
Formally, a BTL structure is a 5-tuple: M =< S, V, R, Pr, s~,~t. > where S is a finite set of states; V is a finite set of variables; R is a finite set of possible transitions between states; (P~ : fi' ~ 2 Ae) assigns to each state the set of atomic propositions that hold in that state; and Sinit E S is the initial state.
Apath is a sequence of states (so, sl, 8z, ...) such that u si+l) E R]. The state 80 need not be the initial state of a BTL structure. We use the standard notation to express truth in a structure: (M, 80 [= f) means that the temporal formula f holds at state so in structure M. When the structure M is understood, we simply write so I = f. The relation I = is defined inductively as follows:
2. s0 I = -~y iff not(so I = y).
4. so I = f Vaiffs0 I = yors0 1= g.
so [= A[f Ug]
iff for all paths (so, sl, ...) starting with so,
6. so I = E[fUg] iff for some path (so, sl, ...) starting with so,
The following abbreviations are also used in writing BTL formulas:
means that f holds in the future along every path from s0; that is f is inevitable.
EF(f) =_ E[True U f]
means that there is some path from so that leads to a state at which f holds; that is, f potentially holds.
Test architectures
According to the OSI reference model, a protocol entity communicates by exchanging abstract service primitives (ASPs) with the layers immediately above and below it in order to provide services to the layer above it using the services provided by the layer below it. Thus, a protocol test system contains two test entities, a lower tester (LT) and an upper tester (UT). The LT controls and observes the ASPs at the lower service boundary by monitoring the ASPs at the lower point of control and observation (PCO). Similarly, the UT controls and observes the ASPs at the upper service boundary by monitoring the ASPs at the upper point of control and observation. Generally, the LT functions as the master tester and the UT functions as a test responder. In practice, there are some variations to the above descriptions of testing activities. The lower service boundary of an IUT may not be accessible to the LT, in which case the LT controls and observes those events at a point away from the actual lower boundary of the IUT through the use of an underlying service provider. Moreover, the LT may control and observe the events at the upper service boundary of the IUT in an indirect manner by controlling the activities of the UT through a specialized test management protocol.
Thus, the number of PCOs, the proximity of the PCOs to the IUT, and the interconnection mechanism among the entities in a protocol test system give rise to the notion of basic test architectures [2] . In the OSI testing framework, there are four basic test architectures: local single layer (LS), coordinated single layer (CS), distributed single layer (DS), and remote single layer (RS). From the point of error-detection capabilities, these test architectures have been compared in [15] .
In the CS architecture, the LT communicates with the IUT through the service provider while controlling and observing the IUT's behavior at the lower PCO (L) as shown in figure 2 . The IUT communicates with the service provider through the interaction point N and with the UT through the interaction point U. The LT part of a CS architecture-based test case is written in TTCN and a standardized test management protocol (TMP) is used as the UT whose behavior is deterministically controlled by the LT through the use of command and reply test management protocol data units (TMPDU). A TMP is described in detail in section 7.
Test verification system
Replacing the IUT by the EFSM model of the corresponding protocol specification, the test entities by their respective EFSM representations, the service provider by its EFSM representation, and representing each point of interaction between two communicating entities by two FIFO channels, we derive a test verification system as defined below. Definition 1. A test verification system (TVS) is defined to be a 5-tuple, TVS = < 27, O, P, ~P, C >, where S is an EFSM corresponding to the lower tester (LT-EFSM); O is an EFSM corresponding to the underlying service provider (USP-EFSM); P is an EFSM corresponding to the protocol specification (S-EFSM); ~P is an EFSM corresponding to the upper tester (UT-EFSM); and C' is a set of channel functions defining the interconnection among S, ~2, P, and ~P.
A channel function channeI(EFSM1, EFSM2) denotes that EFSM1 outputs messages to the channel which are received by EFSM2. In general, we denote a test EFSM by T-EFSM while referring to either the lower tester or the upper tester EFSM. Corresponding to a test architecture, we derive a test verification system as follows. Figure 3 . The test verification system for the CS architecture.
4. Replace the underlying service provider module by its EFSM representation, that is, by its input/output behavior.
Replace each interaction point and point of control and observation (PCO)
between two modules in the test architecture by two unidirectional FIFO channels.
In general, we denote a test EFSM by the notation T-EFSM while we refer to any test EFSM including the service provider EFSM. The test verification system for the CS architecture in figure 2 is shown in figure 3 . The LT-EFSM is obtained from a TTCN test case specification as explained in section 2.2. The UT-EFSM is derived from a TTCN test case specification of the upper tester in case of LS and DS architectures and the specification of a test management protocol in case of CS architecture. In case of the RS test architecture, the EFSM model of the UT is dynamically generated in an incremental manner [20] . The S-EFSM is obtained from the formal specification of the protocol written in one of the FDTs: LOTOS, Estelle, and SDL. An outline of a methodology to translate an Estelle specification to an EFSM is discussed in section 2.1 and a detailed methodology can be found in [20] . Protocols specified in LOTOS and SDL can also be translated to their corresponding EFSM models using the methodologies in [27] . The USP-EFSM is obtained from the service specification of the layer providing services to the protocol layer under test.
Outline of the methodology
Temporal logic can be used to model test case properties in terms of safety and liveness properties. Two approaches exist for verifying temporal formulas: theorem proving and model checking. Theorem proving involves logical deduction and requires the protocol and test case specifications to be expressed as temporal formulas. Model checking, on the other hand, involves verifying the properties on a state space. We take the model checking approach because:
1. Formal specifications in one of FDTs and TTCN of protocols and test cases are of common use.
2. These specifications can algorithmically be mapped to EFSM models.
3. Using a modified version of a traditional reachability analysis algorithm, a global state space can be generated.
Therefore, the model-checking approach to test case verification consists of the following four steps:
1. Derive a global state space by combining the behavior of all the entities in the TVS.
2. Associate a set of atomic propositions to each global state.
3. Express the safety and liveness properties of a test case as temporal formulas.
4. Use a model checker to verify whether the global state space derived in step 1 is a model for the test case properties in step 3.
Step 1 is covered below in section 3.4; steps 2-4 are detailed in sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
State space generation
We generate a global state space representing the combined behavior of a test verification system by using a reachability analysis algorithm. The teachability analysis algorithm is based on perturbing a global state using all the executable transitions in the component machines' present states [28] . Definition 2. The global state s of a test verification system TVS = < S, O, P, ~, C > is defined as a 6-tuple < Ss, ~, Ps, fir C~,/-/u v >, where Ss, I2s, P,, and #~ represent the present states of S, S2, P, and #, respectively; C, is a set of states consisting of the present states of each channel in C;/-/is the set containing values of all the variables of the EFSMs in the TVS; and v is a verdict variable assumed to be unique.
In a global state space, the states are connected by global transitions. A global transition in the transition space R is a 6-tuple defined in section 2. The initial global state 80 is defined as follows:
where sinit(S) is the initial state of S; si~it (9) is the initial state of ~; si,m(P) is the initial state of the protocol specification entity P; 8i~itQP) is the initial state of ~P; C~,tu denotes all the channels in C to be empty; and init(H) = ho(S) U ho (12) U ho(P) U h0(~P), where the function h0 denotes initial assignments to the variables in the corresponding EFSM. Notationally, the present state of an EFSM, M, is denoted by the function notation ps(M).
In the following, we define the sets of enabled transitions, executable transitions, pending transitions, and must transitions. 
ZT(s) = Exec(r, s) u Exec(e, 8) u Exee(P, 8) U E ec(a, 8),
where the procedure Exec is given below. ( s, head(channel(E) ), e))) then {TXT ( 
Predicate evaluation.
Here the procedure eval used in computing XT will be defined. This procedure decides on the truth value of the enabling predicate e of a transition in S-EFSM or one of T-EFSMs given a global state s and the IOD at the head of the channel.
Assume that e is expressed in conjunctive normal form such that each operand of a logical operator in e is either a boolean variable or an expression of the form opl relop op2, which we call an elementary predicate, and relop is a relational operator. Next it is assumed that IOD has nonsymbolic values assigned at all leaf nodes. These assumptions are essential for the procedure eval to always return a true or false value. 
State perturbatior~
The idea of state perturbation [28] is central to generating the global state space of a system containing a set of communicating modules. The reachability analysis algorithm [28] generates the global state space of a protocol system consisting of deterministic FSM entities. The reachability analysis algorithm presented in this paper generates the global state space of a system modeled as a set of communicating nondeterministic EFSMs. In addition, the algorithm takes into account the semantics of OTHERWISE events used in a test case [2] .
Given the present global state and a transition, the perturbation function computes the next global state. If the transition is an implicit send in an RS architecture, then the perturbation function also updates the UT-EFSM by calling the UT_gen procedure. In the following definition, the procedure map_to_IOD(Event) is assumed to transform the Event of type ASP or PDU to an IOD. 
., c~}, 1I' U v' >, where //' := h(H) and v' := new_verdict(v, verdict(To)). ff ((From = 27~) A(dir(E) =?) A (channel(E) = c~) A (mEg(E) = head(~)))V ((mEg(E) = OTH) A (ci ~ r then sn := < To, ~2~, P~, ~, {el,..., tail(ci),..., c~}, II' U v' >. if ((From = 278) A(dir(E) =!) A (channel(E) = el)) then
sn := < To, I2,, P~, ~, {cl .... , c~_~o,..., an}, //' U v' >, where C/_ne~ := append (ci,map_to_IOD(msg(E) 
)). if ((From = 27~) A(dir(E) =!)A (channel(E) = IUT))

c~(~, P) E C Call UT_gen(s, r). if ((From = Ps) A int(E)), then
~ := < S~, 08, To, 08, {c1,..., c~,..
., c~},//' u v' >. if ((From = Ps) A(dir(E) =?) A (channel(E) = ci) A (mEg(E) = head(c4))),
then s,~ := < 27,, J2,, To, ~,, {cl,..., tail(c~),..., c,~},//' U v' >. 
if ((From = P~) A(dir(E) =!) A (channel(E) = ei)),
., c~}, H' t_J v' >, where H' := h(H) and v' = new_verdict(v, verdict(To)). if (((From = ~) A(dir(E) = ?) A (channel(E) = o4) A (msg(E) = head(cO))V ((msg(E) = OTH)A
.. an}, II' U v' > if ((From = ~) A(dir(E) = !) h (channel(E) = ci)), then sn := < S~, ~, P,, To, {cl,..., ei_~c~o,..., c~}, H' U v' >, where e~c~ := append( c4, map_to_I O D( msg( E) ) ).
return (sn)) } In the TTCN specification of a test case, a test designer may associate intermediate test verdicts with expected receive events from an implementation and a final test verdict may be assigned on termination of a test case behavior. Depending on the expected responses of an implementation, different verdictspass, fail, or inconclusive-may be assigned to receive events in a sequence of test behavior. The resultant test verdict at any point in a sequence of test behavior depends on the previous verdict and the current verdict. Therefore, to compute a resultant verdict in a state given the previous verdict and the present verdict, in the following we define a procedure new_verdict (or, pv) , where ov is the old verdict or the previous verdict and pv is the present verdict. 
}}
The RS test architecture does not have an explicitly defined upper tester. However, while executing an RS architecture-based test case, it is required to specify some behavior at the upper service boundary of the IUT. 1. Explore all paths from P, until a transition r3 =< s3, s~, E3, e3, h3, n3 > is encountered such that the event E3 matches E~. Let r2 =< s2, a~, E2, e2, h2, n2 > be a transition on the path from P3
to *3 such that ((dir(E2) = ?)A (channel(E2) = channelOI', P))).
Generate:
En = channel( E2)!event( E2)
hn = a set of assignments to the field of En such that e2 is satisfied and all tansitions up to and including r3 can be fired.
Update the UT behaviour by creating a state aj+l and two transitions r ! =< aj, aj+l, En, true, hm 1 >, r" =< aj+l, aj+l, OTH, true, r 1 > k~ ----< S' LI {aj+l}, r RU{r', r"}, ao, {aS+l}, h, CI, CO > }
In the following, we present a state space generation algorithm based on the traditional reachability analysis algorithm extended to EFSMs [28] . Our algorithm handles some special characteristics of test specifications such as nondeterminism, OTHERWISE events, and verdict computation.
Channel capacities.
In a reachability analysis-based validation system, where communication paths between state machines are modeled as FIFO channels or queues, it is important to analyze the effects of channel capacities on the validation process. A channel capacity can be either bounded or unbounded. The existence of system states in which the channel bounds are exceeded may indicate that the validation is incomplete [29] . However, the validation problem becomes unsolvable if channel capacities are assumed to be unbounded [16] . In a physical implementation, all channels must be bounded. Therefore, while analyzing a test system, we assume that all channels are bounded. This assumption precludes any possibility of the global state space being infinite. For the model checking method to work, it is essential to have a finite global state space.
With bounded channel capacities, there are possibilities of channel overflows. In the global state generation algorithm, channel overflows are handled by not perturbing a state using a transition that causes a channel overflow. This method of handling channel overflows is similar to the one in [29] .
In the following algorithm, the predicate channdoverflow(s) in a state s is evaluated as follows. Every global state contains the present contents of each channel. To evaluate the predicate channeloverflow(s), the number of messages in each channel is compared with the bounded capacity of the channel. If the number of messages in the channel exceeds the channel capacity, then the predicate evaluates to true.
Algorithm 1
Input: a set of EFSMs, a set of communication channels, and the capacities of the channels. 
Model generation
A model for a TVS is generated from the global state space of the TVS by associating a set of atomic propositions to each state. Therefore, we first identify the predicate types and then present an algorithm to systematically associate a set of predicates with each global state. 5. Verdict predicate: This is an assertion about the test verdict and is one of the following three: (Verdict = = P), (Verdict = = I), and (Verdict = = F).
Atomic propositions
The first three classes of predicates are common to all communication systems and have been found to be useful in verifying communication protocols [26] . The last two classes of predicates are specific to protocol test systems. The first four classes of predicates are used in specifying safety properties and the verdict predicate is used in specifying iiveness property of a test case.
Algorithm
Algorithm 2
Input: the state set S and the transition set R of the global state space. Output: predicated S. S1. Initialization: Vs E S, Pr(s) = r , where Pr assigns a set of predicates to s. $2. Vr =< s, s', a, e, h, n >E R do Pr(s) = Pr(s) U Pper(r) PKs') = mKs') u Pge. (~) The functions Pper and Pgen are defined to compute the set of atomic predicates evaluated to true in a global state. The function Pper(r) associates a set of predicates with a state s when s is perturbed by the executable transition r. Similarly, the function Pgen(r) associates a set of atomic predicates with the state s' when s' is generated by perturbing the state s using the transition r. 
nper(r){/ * r =< s, s', E, e, h, m > * / if (ext(E)A (dir(E)
-
if (ext(E) and r is a test transition), then { if (dir(E) ==?) then temp = {AFTER (Treceive(pco(E), message(E)))}; else if (dir(E) == t) then temp = {AFTER(Tsend(pco(E), message(E)))};
} else if (ext(E) and r is a protocol specification transition), then { if (dir(E) ==?) then temp = {AFTER (Sreceive(pco(E), message(E)))}; else if (dir(E) --= !) then temp = {AFTER (Ssend(pco(E) , message(E)))}; } else temp= {}; return (temp)
Safety and liveness properties
Safety properties
Based on the idea that nothing bad happens during a testing process, we classify the safety properties of a test case into four distinct types: transmission safety, reception safety, synchronization safety, and verdict safety. Each type of safety property is defined below.
]Transmission safety:
There are two transmission safety properties corresponding to transmission of events by the test case and transmission of events by the protocol.
INIT 1= (AFTER(Tsend(Q, E)) ~ AFTER(Sreeeive(Q, E))) and 2. INIT [= (AFTER(Ssend(Q, E)) ~ AFTER(Treceive(Q, E))).
In the above formulas, Q is any communication channel between the test system and the protocol specification; and E stands for an event. Intuitively, the first property states that every event sent by the test case must eventually be accepted by the protocol specification. That means the test case does not generate any event that is unacceptable to the protocol. The second property states that every event generated by the protocol specification during the testing process must eventually be accepted by the test case, i.e., the test case is ready to receive any event generated by the protocol. Satisfaction of these two properties ensures that there is no blocking reception error in the test case [30] .
Reception safety: There are two reception safety properties corresponding to reception of events by the test case and reception of events by the protocol. (Qs, 17, 8) 
INIT ]= (AT(Treceive
) ~ AFTER(Treeeive(Qi, Ei))V AFT E R(Tinternal) ) and 2. INIT [= (AT(Sreceive(Qs, E,)) ~ dFTER(Sreceive(Qi, Ei))V AFT E R( Pinternal) ).
In the above formulas, AT(Treeeive(Q~, Es)) = AT(Treceive(Q1, E1))V
AT(Treceive(Qn, En)).
The predicate AT(Sreceive(Qs, E.~)) is defined in a similar way. Intuitively, the first (second) reception property states that when control reaches a state in the test case (protocol specification) where there is a set of alternative receive events, one receive event must be enabled or an internal event must occur in that state. Satisfaction of these two properties ensures that the test case is not deadlocked with the protocol specification. The internal event may be due to a timeout.
Synchronization safety:
This safety property is a special characteristic of protocol testing and is not found in conventional program testing. The issue of synchronization in a test case, which is an event timing problem, was first studied in [31] using deterministic FSM models of a protocol specification and a test case. This problem arises when the test system interacts with the protocol through two PCOs. Conceptually, a test case faces a synchronization problem at one of the PCOs if an output test event is preceded by a sequence of events consisting of internal protocol events and/or a test event occurring at the other PCO. We express the synchronization safety properties using the until(U) operator as follows. The first (second) synchronization safety property is for the lower (upper) PCO.
Verdict safety: Intuitively, during the testing process a test case must not assign a Fail verdict to any behavior allowed by the protocol specification. Therefore, a BTL structure representing the composed behavior of a test and a protocol specification must not contain any state with the (Verdict = = Fail) predicate true. Therefore, the verdict safety property is formulated as follows.
Liveness property
While testing a protocol implementation using a test case, if the implementation fulfills the test purpose, the test case assigns a Pass verdict. Therefore, the test case behavior satisfying the test purpose must end with a Pass verdict. Satisfaction of the test purpose is a good thing that must happen in a test case. Thus, a test case that has the liveness property means the test behavior satisfies the test purpose and eventually assigns a Pass verdict. The liveness property is formally stated as follows.
INIT l= (fl ~ (Verdict = = Pass)), where fl is a temporal formula representing the test purpose. In the following, we present a notation for representing test purposes fl. A notation for test purt~ses. 5.2.1.1 . Primitive test purposes. We identify the following five primitive test purposes from which more complex test purposes can be derived. The test purposes are expressed as temporal formulas using the operator defined in section 2.
5.2.1.
Direct response (p, A AFTER(Tsend(Qi, E~)) A (t = T)) (p~ A AFTER(Treceive(Qj, Ej)) A (T < t < T + To)
This purpose states that if the test system sends an event E~ to the protocol through the channel Q~ at time T with the predicate ps true, then it receives an event Ej from the protocol through the channel Qj during an interval of length To such that the predicate pr is true.
Timed response
(Ps A (t ----T)) ~-* (pr A AFTER(Treceive(Qj, Ej)) A (T < t < T + To))
This purpose states that if the predicate p, is true in the test system at time T and the test system waits without doing anything, then it receives an event Er from the protocol through the channel Qr during an interval of length To such that the predicate pr is true. This test purpose can be used to specify a conformance requirement in which the protocol outputs an event after a timeout.
No response to external input (p~ A AFTER(Tsend(Qi, Ei)) A (t = T)) (p, A -~ AFT E R(Treceive( ANY_channel, ANY_event ) )A (T < t < T + To))
This purpose states that if the test system sends an event Ei to the protocol through the channel Q~ at time T with the predicate p~ true and waits an interval To, then no event is received from the protocol specification through any of the channels during the same period. This purpose is useful to model a conformance requirement in which the protocol ignores an invalid/inopportune event and does not output any event.
No response in an interval
(p~ A (t = T)) ~ (p, A -AFTER(Trecieve(ANY, ANY))A (T < t < T + To))
This purpose states that if the predicate ps is true in the test system at time T and the test system waits for an interval To, then no event is received from the protocol specification through any of the channels during the same period. This purpose is useful to model a conformance requirement in which a timer does not prematurely expire in the protocol.
Eventual response (p~ A (t = T)) ~ (pr A AFTER(Treceive(Qi, El)) A (T < t < oc))
Intuitively, this purpose states that if the predicate p~ is true in the test system at time T and the test system waits indefinitely without doing anything, then it eventually receives an event E~ from the protocol through the channel Qi such that the predicate pr is true. This test purpose can be used to specify a conformance requirement in which the protocol nondeterministically outputs an event. Though this purpose looks like a special case of the timed response test purpose, conceptually they are different.
Composing test purposes.
We define SEQ, a sequential operator for composing primitive test purposes into larger test purposes using the following syntax where fl and ./'2 are two test purposes. so 1= (fl SEQ f2) iff so I = fl and Vs~ ~ last(f1)3sj E reachable(si) s.t. s~ I = f2. Intuitively, (fl SEQ f2) means f2 is satisfied after liThe function reachable(s) returns a set of states that can be reached from s. The function last(f) is the set of all the terminating states of the finite paths from 80, over which f is evaluated. In the expression so [= f, the formula f is evaluated over a set of paths starting with so.
For example, referring to figure 4, let a formula f be evaluated over all the finite paths whose extents are indicated by the bold states. Then last(f) = {83, 85, a6~ 89, Sll}. f2, and fl SEQ f2. In the following, we present algorithms for each of these expressions.
In general, fl and f2 can be any temporal formulas with arbitrary nesting of subformulas and temporal operators. However, in the context of this paper in expressing the safety properties of test cases, only the logical operators --1, v, and A are used. No temporal operators such as the until operator are needed. 
Evaluation of SEQ
Model-checking algorithm
Using global state space S and its transitions R derived from algorithm 1 and predicated in algorithm 2 and safety and liveness properties stated in section 5, we are in a position to apply the model-checking algorithm of [23] . The following algorithm uses algorithms 3 and 4 and the algorithm for evaluating the until operator given in [23] to verify test cases.
Algorithm 4
Input: BTL structure M and a test case property as a temporal formula f. Output: Correctness of f.
1. Obtain the total number of subformulas in f denoted by length(f).
2. Build two arrays n f [1 : length(f) ] and sf [1 : length(f) In the above procedure, we do not need a procedure to evaluate the operator ~-+, since (fl H f2) -= AG(fl --~ aF(f2)).
Example
In this section, we present an example of verifying a test case chosen from a CS architecture-based test suite [13] designed to test a class 2 transport protocol implementation. The CS architecture and its corresponding test verification system are shown in figures 2 and 3, respectively.
Z1. Class 2 transport protocol specification
A nondeterministic EFSM model of a class 2 transport protocol specification [32] is shown in figure 5 . State 1 is both the initial and final state of the EFSM and represents a closed connection. State 10 corresponds to an open connection state. On one hand, if the connection establishment procedure is initiated by the user of the transport entity, then the EFSM moves from state 1 to state 10 through the state sequence {1, 2, 3, 4, 10}. In this case, if the peer entity refuses to establish a connection, then the EFSM goes back to the initial state through the sequence {1, 2, 3, 19, 20, 21, 1} . On the other hand, if the connection is established by the peer entity, then the EFSM moves from state 1 to state 10 through the sequence {1, 5, 6, 7, 10} . In this ease, a request for connection establishment can be refused by the protocol EFSM such that the EFSM goes back to the % Initial State Figure 6 . Underlying service provider of the transport protocol.
initial state through the state sequence {1, 5, 1}. However, if the request for connection establishment is refused by the user of the protocol entity, then the protocol EFSM goes back to the initial state through the sequence {1, 5, 6, 8, 1}. There are two internal transitions in the EFSM. The first internal transition from state 10 to 11 models the effect of the environment on the protocol specification leading to a disconnection of the transport connection along the state sequence {10, 11, 12, 9, 1}. The second internal transition from state 10 to 18 models the acknowledgment (AK) transmission policies including timeouts. The transitions of the EFSM shown in figure 5 are given in Appendix A.
Service provider
The transport protocol, in order to provide the desired service to its user, uses the services of a network layer. That is, the network layer acts as the underlying service provider in the CS test architecture. A simplified EFSM view of the service provider is shown in figure 6 . The transitions of the EFSM are given in Appendix B
Test management protocol (TMP)
A TMP is required to function as a test responder (upper tester) while testing an implementation in the CS architecture. In this section, we explain a TMP [13] corresponding to a transport protocol. The TMP contains three types of internal variables: counts, models, and stored items.
There are 38 count variables, C1-C38, which monitor the traffic of transport service primitives across the interface between the TMP and the transport protocol entity. Counts are assigned to each category of service primitive in each direction across the interface. Data and expedited data octets received by the TMP entity are also counted. The behavior of the TMP is controlled by the lower tester through a set of 25 mode parameters, M1-M25. Mode parameters are used to define the series of actions which make up the response to received events or for generating data to be sent. The 28 stored items S1-$28 consist of additional variables, which include the last received parameters from incoming service primitives and the values supplied as parameters to outgoing primitives. The TMP's internal variables can be controlled and monitored by the lower tester through the 23 test management protocol data units (TMPDUs), which can be classified into two groups: command and reply. The lower tester can issue a command to the TMP to take some action by sending a command TMPDU and the TMP can send a reply to the lower tester through a reply TMPDU.
We show the EFSM description of the part of the TMP that is used in the verification of a test case in figure 7 . The transitions of the TMP EFSM are given in Appendix C.
Test case
For verification purposes we select a test case from a human-designed CS architecture-based test suite [13] . The main dynamic behavior of the test case is shown in figure 8 . For the sake of clarity, the subtrees of the test case, identified by a "+" sign in front of them, are not shown here. The functionality of the test case consists of two distinct phases: preamble and test body. The preamble part consists of five steps. In the first step, the test case establishes a transport connection between the LT and the TMP. In the second step, the LT sends a command TMPDU (TMPDU1) directing the TMP to set the default values of its counters, mode parameters, and stored items. In the third step, the LT sends a command TMPDU (TMPDU4) directing the TMP to set the value of the stored item $8, which is used as the "User_data" parameter in a T-CONNECT response primitive. The "User_data" parameter in a T-CONNECT response primitive becomes the "User_data" parameter in a connect confirm transport protocol data unit (CC TPDU). In the fourth step, the LT waits for acknowledgments of the previously sent two DT TPDUs containing the TMPDUs from the implementation. In the fifth step, the LT disconnects the transport 
Model generation
We generate the global state space of the test verification system, shown in figure 3 , by using the LT-EFSM in figure 9 , the USP-EFSM in figure 6 , the S-EFSM in figure 5 , and the TMP-EFSM in figure 7 . The global state space contains 110 states and 109 transitions. We show the entire global state space in EFSM notation in [20] and only partially in graphical form in figure 10 .
The states g34 and g87 have been obtained by perturbing state g33 using the transitions SPEC_17 and SPEC_7 in XT(g33), respectively.
Z6. Verification of safety and liveness properties
The global state space of the TVS, shown in figure 10 
The predicate AFTER(Ssend(N, NDTreq(CC))) holds in the global state g14, but the predicate AFTER(Treceive(L, NDTind(CC))) holds only in state g17. Therefore, the property AFTER(Ssend(N, NDTreq(CC))) ~-* AFTER (Treceive(L, NDTind(CC) )) holds on all the paths except path (gt, g6) . That is, the safety property does not hold on all possible executions of the test system. This safety error arises because of a timeout in the test case as explained in the 
~F~il ~ "'.~ Figure I0 . Global state space.
following. From the global state g16, there are two possible transitions, r5 and r16, which are derived from the LT_4 and LT_5 transitions in the test case EFSM. Transition LT_4 represents a timeout event as an alternative to transition LT_5, which is an L?NDTind(CC) event. If the timeout occurs before the test case receives the NDTind(CC) event from PCO L, then the safety error would occur.
Consider another transmission safety property
INIT l= AFTER(Ssend(N, NDTreq(AK))) AFT E R( Treceive( L, N DTind( AK) ) ) ).
The predicate AFTER(Ssend(N, NDTreq(AK) )) holds in state g35, but the predicate Treceive(L, NDTind(AK)) holds only in state 941. Therefore, the formula
AFT E R( Ssend( N, N DTreq( AK) ) ) AFT E R( Treceive( L, N DT ind( AK) ) )
does not hold on the path path(gl,g4o) leading to a transmission safety error in the test system. This error is also due to the timeout in the test case represented by the LT_12 transition. The other transmission safety properties, which are not satisfied due to the test case timeout transitions LT_19, LT_25, and LT_31, are
INIT I= (AFTER(Tsend(L, NDTreq(CR))) AFTER(Sreceive(N, NDTind(CR)))), and
INIT I= (AFTER(Tsend(L, NDTreq(DC))) AFT E R( Sreceive( N, N DT ind( DC) ) ) ),
respectively. It is observed that if the timeouts in the test case are appropriately tuned, then all the above transmission safety properties are satisfied. That is, in a qualitative sense, if the timeouts are well tuned, then the global transitions r5, r39, r45, r59, and v77 would be absent from the global state space and the safety properties would hold in the remainder of the state space. Two other transmission safety properties, which do not hold in the test system, are:
INITI= (AFTER(Ssend(N, NDTreq(DR))) AFT E R( Treceive( L, N DTind( D R ) ) ) ) and
I N I TI= (AFT E R( Ssend( N, N DTr eq( AK ) ) ) AFT E R( Treceive( L, N DT ind( AK) ) ) ).
The predicate AFTER(Ssend(N, NDTreq(DR) )) holds in the state g89, but the predicate does not hold in any of the states following gs9. To find out the cause of the error, we analyze the test system in the following.
The test system arrives at global state gs9 from state g33 due to the global transition sequence {rs6, rs7, r88} derived from the transition sequence {SPEC_7, SPEC_8, SPEC_9} in the protocol specification EFSM. The sequence {SPEC_7, SPEC_8, SPEC_9} means the specification nondeterministically releases an open connection by sending a TDISind primitive to its service user and a DR TPDU to its peer entity, which is the test case EFSM in this situation. The safety error denotes a design error in the test case in the sense that the test case is not ready to receive the DR TPDU from the protocol specification. Similarly, the second transmission safety error is due to a design error in the test case in the sense that after the establishment of a transport connection, the test case is not ready to receive spontaneous acknowledgment (AK) TPDUs from the protocol specification.
Z6.2. Liveness properly.
To verify the liveness property of the test case, we first express the test purpose as a temporal formula. As a part of the test case, the test purpose is specified in a natural language as follows:
1. LT sends CR.
LT receives CC with VAL octets of user data.
In the following, corresponding to each part of the test purpose, we state a temporal formula:
AFTER(Tsend(L, NDTreq(CI=t))).
(AFTER(Treceive(L, NDTind(CC))) and (NDTind.CC.User_data = VAL))~
We compose these basic test purposes using the SEQ operator to give rise to a formula for the entire test purpose as follows:
fl = (AFTER(Tsend(L, NDTreq(CR))))SEQ (AFT E R( Treceive( L, N DTind( C C) ) ) A (NDTind.CC.User_data = VAL))).
Then, the liveness property of the test case is stated as INIT I= (fl (verdict = Pass) All other paths do no satisfy the test purpose. The paths reachable due to the timeout transitions (r5, r39, r45, r59, and r77) can be avoided from the global states by appropriately turning the timeout intervals. However, the test purpose is not satisfied if the implementation behaves nondeterministically.
Related research
The topic of test case verification is a relatively new research area. There are very few published works in the direction of verifying single connection test cases, that is, test cases with no parallelism [33] [34] [35] .
The first verification approach [33] consists of two steps. First, a TTCN test case is translated into a LOTOS specification. Second, a test and trace analysis tool, based on a LOTOS interpreter [36] , takes the LOTOS description of the test case and that of the protocol specification as inputs and computes their parallel composition by tracing all the executable paths in the two specifications. The concerns expressed about the tool are its high run-time space requirement and long verification time. Another disadvantage of the technique is that it is applicable only to test cases designed to run in the local single-layer test architecture.
The second verification approach [34] consists of three steps. First, a TrCN test case and the formal description of a protocol are translated to a common EFSM notation. Second, a global state space representing all the possible interaction sequences between the test case and the protocol specification is obtained using a reachability analysis algorithm. Third, the global state space is analyzed to detect errors such as unspecified receptions, deadlocks, synchronization errors, etc. [30] . This approach does not take into account many test system attributes such as test architectures, test management protocols, test purpose, etc.
In the third verification approach [35] , a tool interprets TTCN test cases and compares the defined behavior with the behavior produced by a formal description technique (FDT) simulator. In this approach, there is no formal model of the verification process, rather the verification process has been treated in an informal and intuitive manner.
Conclusions
We presented a test case verification methodology consisting of four steps: generating a state space by combining the behaviors of the test case and protocol specification EFSMs, associating atomic propositions to these states, expressing the safety and liveness properties of a test case as branching time temporal logic formulas, and finally verifying the test case properties on the state space using a model-checking algorithm. The complexity of the model-checking process is linear in the size of the state space.
We identified four types of test safety properties: transmission safety, reception safety, synchronization safety, and verdict safety. The first two types of safety properties are due to the communication functions of a test case and are similar to the safety properties of any data transmission protocol. The last two safety properties are unique to test systems. The synchronization safety is due to the fact that output events of the lower and upper testers must satisfy some timing constraints. The verdict safety property ensures that the test case does not assign a Fail verdict to an implementation behavior accepted by the protocol specification. Since the assignment of a Pass verdict is directly coupled with the satisfaction of the test purpose, a notation was presented to formally specify test purposes. The liveness property of a test case is derived using the test purpose and the Pass verdict.
We applied the verification methodology to a test case in a real test suite developed for the transport protocol. Our methodology led to the detection of a few errors in safety properties. Those errors were due to the nondeterministic output acknowledgment PDUs and nondeterministic disconnection of transport connections.
In our technique, so far only a sequential composition of primitive test purposes was sufficient to model the test cases of the test suites we have studied. Investigation of other composition operators, especially parallel composition operators would be useful in the context of concurrent TTCN, which is being defined by the standardization organizations. We assumed that fixed values are assigned to the PDU/ASPs exchanged during global state space computation. Consideration of symbolic values in the input/output structures is another extension of our methodology.
In this verification methodology, we generate the global behavior of a test verification system using a reachability analysis technique. State explosion is a limitation of any verification technique involving rechability analysis. In the context of protocol validation, a number of techniques have been proposed to contain the state explosion [37] . The state explosion problem arising while generating the global behavior representing all possible interaction sequences between a test case and a protocol specification is analyzed as follows. A protocol specification is assumed to provide several protocol functions and, generally, one test case is designed to test one protocol function. That is, due to the execution of one test case, only a small part of a large protocol specification is activated. Therefore, the process of generating the global behavior representing all the interaction sequences of a test case represented by a small EFSM and a protocol specification denoted by a large EFSM would not result in state space explosion.
The liveness property is expressed using a sequential combination of a few basic test purposes which may contain predicates in terms of real-time. Further research is needed to incorporate the notion of time in protocol and test case models similar to the timed-transition systems in [38] . 
